



Keith Dixon and Daniel Perraud
The French Experiment

France has seen a year of far-reaching reforms. But the Right is on the move and the Left is vulnerable.

During the run-up to the presidential elections in France a year ago two contrasting scenarios of an eventual Socialist victory were presented by the critics of Francois Mitterrand. The Right predicted ominously that with Mitterrand elected president the way would be open for a Marxist take-over which, along Chilean lines, would lead to economic chaos, a violent polarisation of social and political forces and inevitably to civil war. On the Left, the Communist Party warned of the quite different danger of a Socialist-dominated government abandoning its programme under capitalist pressure, postponing the task of socialist transformation of society and thus betraying the hopes and expectations of the working class. The reality of left wing rule over the past twelve months has turned out to be quite different.

Undoubtedly there has been a polarisation of political forces, and a radicalisation of right wing opposition among certain strata of the population (farmers, small employers, for example); however, there are as yet no signs of the apocalypse promised by the Right.

The key word 'change', used amply during the election campaign, meant very different things to different people.

Although there have been signs of growing dissatisfaction and impatience in the working class, this can hardly be said to be due to the 'betrayal' of the Mauroy government, which, on the contrary, has given a radical thrust to certain policies derived from the electoral programme of Francois Mitterrand.'

Thus, neither creeping social democratisation nor a radical destabilisation of capitalist society, the present French experiment defies

the comfortable, clear-cut categories inherited from the past. Several factors contribute to making the French situation quite distinct both from previous periods in French history (1936,1945) and from Left governments elsewhere.

Special characteristics

Firstly, the Left in France is deeply divided despite the participation of the two major parties in government. For three years (1978-1981) after the official break in left unity, Communists and Socialists were in open conflict, hurling slogans and the occasional insult at each other. The election results of May-June 1981 did nothing to resolve or overcome these divergences. The necessary facade of 'governmental solidarity' on the basis of left unity, around a scanty joint agreement signed in June 1981, simply drove the divergences unhealthily underground. All the old grievances remain not only between Communists and Socialists, but probably also within the Socialist Party where the right wing anti-Marxist rival of Mitterrand, Michel Rocard, now Minister of the Plan, continues to have substantial support. This is undoubtedly one of the major handicaps of the government, which has not only led to certain incoherencies and contradictions on a policy level, but also prevents a clear statement of political and economic objectives.

Secondly, despite this lack of clarity with respect to the overall objectives of government strategy, the Mauroy government has been implementing a radical programme of economic and social reform — sometimes under the combined pressure of hostile forces both in

'The new government's programme is very largely inspired by Mitterrand's political platform during the presidential elections; his '110 Proposals for France' were adopted by the extraordinary Congress of the Socialist Party at Creteil, in January 1981.

Mauroy



Rocard



France and abroad — but in an ultra-parliamentary manner. Since the Left government came to power a year ago, there has been virtually no popular mobilisation in favour of government policies and very little extra-parliamentary pressure.

Thirdly, the Left has come to power in a country which has been dominated for more than twenty years by right wing rule. This unbroken domination enabled the Right, particularly during the Gaullist period from 1958 until 1974, to extend its political hegemony throughout all the major state institutions, to impregnate social relations with its modes of thought, and to win over, by various means, substantial sectors of the population, in particular the farming community and the self-employed. The relations between the state and industry, between the repressive apparatus (police, judicial system etc) and the population, the functioning of the state-controlled media all bear the mark of these last twenty years. Thus although the right wing parties suffered an undoubted political defeat a year ago, and despite the present back-biting and internal disputes particularly within the former presidential party, the UDF,² the Right continues to dispose of a powerful means of opposing government policies by fostering discontent in its traditional non-wage-earning support strata.

Fourthly, the highly authoritarian and anti-democratic constitution, made to measure for De Gaulle in 1958, is being used by Mitterrand and Mauroy in order to keep a tight rein on the direction of the government. Each measure implemented by the government has been subject to the interaction of various contradictory pressures resulting from the present political situation: within the Left, between those in favour of radicalising to a maximum the process of social change already underway (PCF and the left wing of the Socialist Party) and those who have opted for a more accommodative strategy of compromise (the Rocardians, but also the influential Minister of the Economy, Jacques Delors) and from the Right, where a highly reactionary opposition to government policy has been growing (see below, our discussion of industrial and agricultural strategies). The constitution bestows exorbitant powers on the President of the Republic and makes him of more central political importance than either the National Assembly or the government. Mitterrand has made the most of these powers to prevent stalemate on major policy issues.

Lastly, an unfair electoral system has enabled the Socialist Party, with only one third of the votes in the general elections, to obtain an

overall majority in the National Assembly until 1986. Thus, in institutional terms the Socialists are free to do as they wish, and are dependent neither on the Communists nor on the Left Radicals for pushing their legislation through parliament. This undoubtedly explains certain signs of over-confidence during the first months of power — but it also renders all the more surprising the policies adopted by the Socialist-dominated government over the last twelve months.

THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMME

When the Mauroy government took office a year ago, it was by no means clear what type of policies would be pursued. The government programme was to be based on Mitterrand's presidential election platform — but betrayed electoral promises are a commonplace in modern French political history. This was all the more likely since the motivations of the left electorate in the May-June elections were not crystal-clear either. Undoubtedly, the radical anti-capitalist policies of the Communist Party had resonated well beyond the declining Communist electorate (16.1% in the general elections). But this was not the only current of opinion. The Left also benefited from a desire for political change due to a general weariness with the politics and politicians of the Right. The key word 'change' however, used amply during the election campaign and since then, meant very different things to different people. Thus, in particular behind the Socialist vote lay heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory political attitudes. Many Centre-Right voters, for example, who shifted towards the Socialists twelve months ago clearly believed that Mitterrand, like Giscard before him, would quickly turn his back on his election platform. In these conditions, one of the major surprises of the first year of Left government has been the radical content given to the vague notion of 'change' by the Socialist-dominated coalition.

In the economic sphere the government has reversed the ultra-classical logic of the previous prime minister, Raymond Barre (austerity, budget restrictions, orthodox defence of the franc, anti-working class repression etc) by a series of measures intended to reflate the economy. Real efforts have been made to increase working class purchasing power and therefore home demand. Priority has been given to small and medium-sized firms in industry through increased subsidies and various compensatory measures to offset the effects of certain social reforms (the increase in the minimum wage,

for example). Above all, the government has clearly stated that it considers the reduction of unemployment to be its major task' and has acted accordingly (a projected boost of 500,000 jobs created over the next two years — 40,000 already created in the public sector before December 1981; the reduction of working time, with the objective of a 35-hour week in 1985; the lowering of the retirement age to 60; a vast programme of professional training for the 16 to 18 year olds intended to totally absorb youth unemployment in this age bracket etc).

Major structural changes which are likely to change the face of the French economy, and French society as a whole, have already been undertaken. Through the extensive *nationalisation programme*, the state will take control of key sectors of industry: almost all steel and aluminium production, half of glass production, most of the light chemicals industry, most electrical engineering and electronics, half of computer production, and a substantial share of the building and Pharmaceuticals industry. By nationalising almost all of the banking sector, the state will be able to control the financing of its industrial programme. Plans to democratise the public sector, by giving extended powers to plant and workshop committees are considered as a necessary antidote to the danger of bureaucratisation in this area, and are to be presented to the National Assembly this year.

Similarly, the *decentralisation programme* which is now underway, although nothing very radical from a British point of view, undoubtedly constitutes a major break with what has become the debilitating tradition of Jacobin centralism. The transfer of power to the regional assemblies, the abolition of the all-powerful nominated post of prefect etc, are a major advance, and a necessary pre-condition for the all-round development of democratic control — another of the stated objectives of the government.

Who Should Pay?

Quite obviously many of these economic and social reforms have been costly, and a muted battle has been going on within the government, and on the Left in general, concerning the means of financing them. Here again two opposing positions have been expressed — more or less explicitly — by government supporters. The Communists have, on several occasions, insisted on a more resolute deduction from capitalist profits." On the other hand, Rocard and Delors have both insisted on the need for caution, and have — more or less directly — advanced the idea of long term austerity measures (these ideas have had a favourable echo in the right wing of the trade union movement, particularly in the leadership of the CFDT).

In reality the government has used a combination of traditional and more progressive devices in order to cover these increased costs. It has increased the tax burden and the budget deficit. Although the population in general has had to pay through indirect taxes (petrol, tobacco etc) and through a special contribution of 1% of all wages to cover the Social Security deficit, special attention has also been given to the well-off: an exceptional tax on banks and oil companies; increased income tax for high income groups; a wealth tax, which although much diluted after a long battle in parliament nonetheless constitutes a progressive innovation.

Ambiguities

Despite more egalitarian measures concerning income or taxes, and the progressive economic and social reforms intended to redistribute power in favour of the working class outlined above, one of the major support strata of the Left, the industrial working class, has been showing signs of disillusionment and impatience over the last few months. Since the end of the six-month 'honeymoon' period at the

turn of the year, industrial unrest — strikes and factory occupations — has been on the increase. Why has this been so?

The first and most obvious answer to this question is that the Left government is engaged on a long term strategy, and thus the beneficial effects of some of its major policies (the nationalisations, for example) have not yet been felt by the population. Moreover, the social measures adopted during the summer months of 1981 have had a reduced impact for two main reasons: their political resonance within the working class has been limited in that they mainly affected certain 'marginal', ie, largely unorganised categories (low-paid workers, old-age pensioners, immigrants etc); and all the measures which have been taken in order to increase purchasing power

Since the Left government came to power a year ago, there has been virtually no popular mobilisation in favour of government policies and very little extra-parliamentary pressure.

have been offset to a certain extent by the still relatively high rate of inflation (13-14%).

Secondly, and despite the radical thrust of many of the Left government's policies, the overall strategy remains ambiguous: transition towards socialism, social democratic restructuring of a capitalist society in crisis, or some other uncharted non-capitalist solution? At no time has the government — or the Left coalition — made explicit its long term objectives, nor the means, other than parliamentary, which it intends using to obtain its ends. Quite obviously because these questions have not been hammered out within the Left, there has been a refusal to associate the working class in a full discussion of long term orientations. Even if this ambiguity has been inevitable — because of the deep divisions between Left parties, and the political heterogeneity of the dominant Socialist Party, not to mention the narrow margin of manoeuvre open to the Left and the strength of the Right in certain key social strata — it is nonetheless one of the principal causes of present discontent.

THE OPPOSITION: A RIGHT-WING COMEBACK

Whereas the Left has been unable to raise support in the working class and the government has been wary of extra-parliamentary action in favour of its policies, the opposition on the other hand, has been extremely active, from the very outset and despite its internal difficulties, in rallying support, particularly among the non-wage-earning strata of the population (farmers, for example). It should have come as no surprise that in the recent local elections on the 14 and 21 of March, in which the Left gave a very poor showing indeed,⁵ the Right made its most significant advances in the rural areas. After the disarray of the immediate post-election period last summer and despite the animosity of certain UDF leaders towards

⁵Union pour la Democratique Francaise.

⁶The government's stated and realistic objective is to curb the rise of unemployment in 1982 (it topped the two million mark in Nov 1981) and only to begin to reduce the number of unemployed in 1983. To obtain these results the government is relying on an ambitious annual economic growth rate of 3%.

⁷Given the 'delicate' position of the PCF as a junior partner in government, these anti-capitalist positions have been expressed more clearly by the CGT, which is largely influenced by the Communists.

⁸Although the Socialist Party maintained its influence, the Left as a whole regressed (in particular compared with the last local election results in 1976). The Communist Party, with 15.85%, not only did not improve its June 1981 score, but regressed slightly. On the Right, the RPR leapt forward.

the RPR — which they hold to be partly responsible for Giscard's downfall — the Right has reorganised, and at present is clearly being restructured around the authoritarian, markedly right wing orientations of Jacques Chirac, leader of the neo-Gaullist RPR.⁶

It is however *not* within the specifically political sphere that the Right parties have been making most headway — after all, in purely electoral terms there is little prospect of a Right comeback before the next general elections in 1986 — but rather on the industrial and social fronts, where organised and sometimes violent opposition to government policies has been fostered. Two examples — one in which the Right was nonetheless defeated, and another in which the government had to step down — should help to illustrate this point.

Industrial strategy under fire

The key question of nationalisation and the democratisation of industry gave rise to the major political clash of the first year of Left government. The initial battle was complicated by the fact that the Socialist Party was apparently technically ill-prepared for the discussions involved in the nationalisation debate, and that the top civil servants who were supposed to advise the government deliberately trailed their feet.

This was one of the rare occasions in contemporary French history in which the employers entered directly into the political struggle. Thus, within the nationalisable firms, a campaign was carried on by top management in order to provoke opposition to the government's plans among the employees and management staff; similarly, the nationalisable banks campaigned among their customers in order to raise discontent. Shareholders of the major nationalisable firms were rapidly organised into a lobby against the government. One holding company, Paribas, even went as far as deliberately to sabotage the government's project by clandestinely selling off important subsidiaries abroad.

While the bosses were waging the economic battle, the parties of the Right were fighting the nationalisations politically, making full use of their foothold in the media and multiplying meetings throughout the country. Right wing leaders conjured up images of an imminent French gulag, and used every conceivable argument to show that the radical Marxist Left had taken over, and was planning the wholesale collectivisation of the French economy. The RPR leader, Jacques Chirac, apparently converted to the virtues of Reaganism, preached against all forms of state intervention and warned that the French economy was on the brink of disaster. Meanwhile, in the National Assembly the UDF and RPR parties combined their efforts in order to block the nationalisation bill. The debate lasted 13 days, and 1438 amendments were proposed. When the battle was over in the National Assembly, the Right blocked again in its stronghold, the Senate . . . and finally appealed to the Constitutional Council (entirely composed of former parliamentary figures of the Right), which sent back the bill to be corrected and watered down.

Despite extraordinary pressure from home and abroad, and while continuing to respect a constitution which was being politically manipulated against it, the Left remained surprisingly united on this issue. Although several influential ministers (including the Minister of the Economy) were known to be hostile to the nationalisation programme, the government nonetheless held on until the end, and the bill was finally voted in February of this year. Although the programme was more limited than some (the Communists) would have hoped, and the compensation paid out to the shareholders was more than generous (this was clearly a political manoeuvre aimed at 'neutralising' the small shareholders), a historic step had been taken after an unprecedented political and institutional battle. However, throughout this period there was no popular mobilisation, no mass

pressure from within the nationalisable firms. The 'popular forces', often evoked fondly by Francois Mitterrand, were not asked to be the actors in this historic event, but only the sympathetic onlookers.

The farmers against the Left

Another significant area of struggle — but this time, where the Left has had to stand down — has been the handling of the farming community; an economically and socially key category in modern France. The last twelve months in the rural areas have illustrated not only the strength and the violence of the Right in defending its former privileges, but also a certain lack of political insight on the part of those in charge of agricultural problems in the new government as well as an under-estimation of the organisational capacities of the Right.

In short, what the Ministry of Agriculture attempted to do was to break the hold of the right wing FNSEA,⁷ by far the most representa-

Many Centre-Right voters who shifted towards the Socialists twelve months ago clearly believed that Mitterrand, like Giscard before him, would quickly turn his back on his election platform.

tive of the farmers' unions, over the farming community. It was considered, rightly, that it was through this organisation that the Right, and in particular the 'national' Gaullist Right, had maintained its influence in the countryside over the last twenty years, and, wrongly, that administrative measures would be sufficient to cut the union down to its rightful size. Playing on the fact that the small left wing farmers' and peasants' unions — the MODEF,⁸ the 'Paysans-Travailleurs',⁹ and the Interpaysanne¹⁰ — had been victimised by the previous regime, the Ministry decided to redistribute its union subsidies, thus financially penalising the FNSEA. Similarly, in the talks between the government and the farmers' representatives, these rival unions were invited for the first time.

These measures however were not backed by any political campaign in the countryside among the potential allies of the government: even the more egalitarian redistribution of an unprecedented government subsidy to the farmers at the annual conference late last year was carried out in a purely technocratic fashion. The outcome was that the scheme backfired: the FNSEA presented itself as an object of Socialist victimisation, proved its representivity in the farming community, and mobilised violent opposition among its supporters to the government's agricultural policy.

This has been a major political setback for the Left, and shows the danger of substituting short term administrative measures for a long term strategy of political persuasion. The Right has cashed in on the growing discontent in the farming community, and if it opts in the future for a strategy of social and political destabilisation, undoubtedly the peasants and farmers will be sent up on to the front line.

The energy-consuming task of restructuring the Right has undoubtedly been an impediment to direct and concerted political activity, and thus, as we have tried to show in the above examples, political opposition has often been mediated through professional organisations representing strata which are strongly influenced by

⁶See our article 'France Moves Left' in *Marxism Today*, September, 1981.

⁷Federation Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles.

⁸Mouvement de Defense des Exploitants Familiaux (which has lately become the COSEF) — close to the Communist Party.

⁹'Worker-Peasants', influenced by the ultra-left.

¹⁰Strongly influenced by the Socialist Party.

the Right. This has evidently been the case for the farmers, but other examples can be found among the police, managerial and technical staff," and of course among employers.

For the employers' organisation, CNPF,¹² however, the situation is complex. Determined efforts have been made by French capital to undermine the government's social and economic policies: unwillingness to invest or create jobs despite subsidies; increased hostility towards the unions and growing recourse to gangster methods (a worker was killed in an industrial dispute in February); some out-and-out sabotage (the Paribas affair). On the other hand, the employers and their organisation are anxious not to be seen to be systematically opposing the government, which might bring about their political isolation, or worse — retaliation from the government (credit squeeze, or some form of price control). Clearly the employers are hoping for the convergence of discontent in the traditional strata won over to conservative ideas — with the medium term prospect of either a right wing takeover, or, more likely, a radical watering down of government policies.

The Left in Government: The Price of Disunity

The 'honeymoon' period from June until December of last year is now very much a thing of the past. The local election results have given new confidence, and attractive propaganda arguments to the right wing parties. Surely, with mounting political opposition in the rural areas, social unrest, and discontent in the factories, it is about time the government and the major Left parties reacted? The situation is far from being dramatic — but it does call for resolute political action. Four brief, and therefore perhaps over-simplified observations should help to explain why this reaction is so slow in coming.


Firstly, the 'dynamics of left unity' which was destroyed by the

break-down of the discussions between Socialists and Communists in September 1977 and the subsequent open hostility which lasted until the presidential elections has never been recovered. The opium of official party and government statements should not lull the outside observer into believing that all is now well on the Left. No attempt has been made, on a leadership level, to engage in a thorough-going discussion on the unresolved strategic and tactical divergences of the 1977-1981 period. As a result, 'left unity' is restricted to the governmental and parliamentary spheres — where it is scrupulously respected — but there are no contacts whatsoever between rank and file organisations of the main parties; or rather, when they do exist, they are officially frowned upon.

Secondly, this muted disunity between the parties of the Left becomes open and sometimes violent polemics when displaced into the field of trade union activity. The relatively acute polarisation of trade union attitudes, particularly since the Polish crisis in mid-December, may be interpreted as the expression of the divisions which cannot be given an airing in the political sphere.

On the right of the union movement three minority confederations, FO,¹³ and CGC and the CFTC," have formed a so-called 'reformist front' whose main objectives would seem to be the ejection of the Communist ministers from the government, and the development of a systematic opposition to the more radical government proposals for democratising industry. FO has developed a MacCarthyite campaign against 'communist infiltration' in the state apparatus.

The CFDT leadership has come out clearly in favour of a 'social contract' type orientation, reproducing the conservative economic analyses of the 'moderate' members of the government, and opposing the CGT's 'maximalist' positions, on the 39-hour with no cut in



CENTRAL BOOKS

**Central America
at Central Books**

**UNDER THE EAGLE • Jenny Pearce •
£2.95 • p/bk**

**SANDINO'S DAUGHTERS •
Margaret Randall • £4.95 • p/bk**

37 Grays Inn Road, London WC1
Open 9.30 — 5.30, Saturdays 10 — 2pm. 01-242 6166



**WORLD
MARXIST
REVIEW**

A Key Principle of the CPSU's Economic Strategy
Vladimir Shcherbitsky

Party Decisions
Milko Balev

Who Finances the Parties and How
Georg Kwiatkowski

How the Integration Mechanism Works
Mikhail Novikov

Significance of Experience to Policymaking
Ernst Wimmer

Single issues 50p (postage extra)
Subscription (1 year) £7 for 12 issues (including postage)

Apply to WMR, Central Books,
14 The Leathermarket, London SE1 3ER.

pay for example. During the Polish crisis it was again the CFDT which occupied the positions which the right wing of the Socialist Party could not defend: the crisis rapidly became a means of obtaining ammunition for the purely French affair of isolating the Communists. Early this year, the CFDT went on to join those on the Right who were protesting against the contract for the provision of Soviet gas to France, criticising Mitterrand and the government for their ambivalent attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

The CGT has taken a significantly different stand to that of its major rival, the CFDT, promoting, whenever possible, industrial action in order to overcome resistance from the employers to the government's economic strategy, and also 'push' the government in the right direction. The CGT may be considered to be occupying a sort of Left vigilante position which the Communist Party, for the reasons we have already mentioned, cannot openly defend. While supporting the general orientation of government policy, the CGT has been critical of the 'moderation' of certain measures: the rise in the minimum wage have been considered too small; the increase in social security contributions and indirect taxes were described as political mistakes. The CGT however, has been weakened by its *rapprochement* to the Communist Party, whose defeat it 'shared' in 1981. The Polish crisis revealed divisions within the CGT, even at leadership level.

This leads us on, *thirdly*, to the historical decline of the French Communist Party. Whatever explanation is given for this decline it has had a detrimental effect on the Left in general. According to the party leadership, and to the 24th Congress resolution recently adopted in St Ouen, the drop in Communist electoral support not only in May 1981, but throughout the sixties and seventies, was due to an over-reliance on two 'external' models: the constant implicit reference to Soviet socialism prevented the Party from defining a coherent alternative to monopoly capitalism in French conditions; and, secondly, the *form* of left unity inherited from the Popular Front experience, and which inspired the Common Programme (1972-1977) was detrimental to the Communists in that it tended to hide the fundamental differences between revolutionary and reformist currents on the Left. Critical party members have pointed out

Right wing leaders used every conceivable argument to show that the radical Marxist Left had taken over, and was planning the wholesale collectivisation of the French economy.

that the Party's isolation on the Left dates from the 1977/1978 period and that the turnabout in party attitudes on key questions such as the analysis of the socialist countries and the alliance between manual and intellectual workers cannot be written off as secondary issues in any honest analysis of that isolation. In any case, the Polish crisis and the position adopted by the leadership of the PCF, which refused both to condemn the military takeover and to demand the release of the imprisoned trade unionists, have done nothing to reverse the process (as the local election results demonstrate). With the decline of the Communist Party, the French Left is being deprived of powerful arms in the present struggle against right wing opposition: the Communist Party represents a potential of militant working class support for the government, and its isolation will create a dangerous gap between the government and the working class; a decline in the electoral, and more generally political influence of the Communists also represents an imbalance on the Left in favour of more moderate, 'social democrat' solutions; and



Delors

lastly, the Communist Party is the only political force on the left capable of mobilising a popular reaction against the present right wing onslaught.

Conclusion

This brings us, *fourthly*, to a final observation by way of a conclusion. After the local election setback, and with mounting right wing opposition throughout the country, the Left government in France is at the crossroads. Until now, the Socialist Party has been unable, and unwilling, to mobilise support for the government which it dominates: it has little or no organisational strength in industry and, moreover, everything would seem to indicate that its preference goes to technocratically-decided economic and social change rather than mass pressure. The fear of alienating precious Centre-Left, middle strata support is undoubtedly a determining factor in this respect. The PCF is now a junior partner in the Left: politically weakened, it is clearly unwilling to throw all its strength behind government policies decided by Francois Mitterrand or Pierre Mauroy.

However, without effective and coordinated mobilisation of popular support there are two inherent dangers in the present situation. Firstly, the institutional (parliamentary) struggle for economic and social change may become totally disconnected from if not contradictory to, the class battles being waged in industry (mainly by the CGT), with the risk that both may be lost in the long term. Secondly, when the government does finally call on popular mobilisation — as it inevitably will have to do, given present trends, if it wishes to remain on its radical trajectory — may not the divisive habits of the past (and present) prevent that support from being forthcoming? D

¹The Confederation Generale des Cadres (CGC) which represents these categories has been waging a violent campaign against the government's fiscal policies, and also against plans to extend workers' democratic control over decision-making in industry.

²Conseil National du Patronat Francais, fraternal organisation of the CBI.

³Force Ouvriere: CIA-financed breakaway from the CGT at the beginning of the Cold War. The general secretary Andre Bergeron, is also a member of the Socialist Party.

⁴Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens: Catholic union which gave birth to the CFDT in 1964. Now, very much a minority confederation.